Rising Tide of Espionage Cases in Israel's Military
The recent arrest of two Israeli air force personnel on espionage allegations highlights Iran's growing campaign to infiltrate Israel's military from the inside. Over the past year and a half, Israeli police and Shin Bet have probed more than 20 cases involving 40 to 50 suspects, most of whom are still in custody while others remain at large. Capt. Sefi Berger from the Israel Police’s Lahav International and Major Crimes Unit, which handles Iranian espionage, explained to Fox News Digital that Tehran targets intelligence for attack planning, high-profile individuals, and sensitive sites.
Payments to these operatives vary significantly—one network of seven suspects pocketed around $300,000, but an Iron Dome reservist got just $1,000, and some even less. Berger noted that recruits often overestimate the rewards: 'People may think they will get rich, but the money is not life-changing.' In one instance, two soldiers were involved; one received a mere $21 and has spent a year and a half in prison.
Recruitment Tactics Exploiting Social Media and Vulnerabilities
Iranian agents infiltrate WhatsApp and Facebook groups where Israelis seek freelance work, as well as pornography sites, using compromising material for blackmail. They also prey on emotional weaknesses, building handler-spy relationships that mimic friendships or father figures. Berger described how 'when recruiting a person, a relationship can develop between the handler and the spy. Sometimes the asset is looking for a father figure or a friend—someone who listens without judgment.'
Former Shin Bet handler Gonen Ben Itzhak, experienced in recruiting Palestinian sources, called this surge unprecedented: he has not seen so many attempts—and successes—against Israel before. Iranians leverage social media powerfully to spot motives, something handlers like him lacked in the past. The process is gradual: starting with secret meetings and simple questions, like who leads Hamas in a village, building to more sensitive tasks. Some refuse, others double-cross, and many are trained to operate undetected.
The million-dollar question is who makes a good recruit. We don’t have a clear answer. There are certain indicators that someone may be more susceptible. The Iranians use social media—something we didn’t have in the same way—and it’s a powerful tool to identify potential motives.
Recent Arrests and Specific Operations
Indictments filed last Friday targeted an Israeli civilian and three soldiers arrested in March for working with Iranian intelligence, even before IDF enlistment. They sent photos and videos of train stations, shopping centers, security cameras, and were told to buy weapons. Some transferred Air Force Technical School documents. In March, 22-year-old Haifa resident Ami Gaydarov was arrested for making explosives aimed at a senior Israeli figure under Iranian direction. Last month, a man from Qalansawe was detained after Al Jazeera mediated contact with his handler while job-hunting.
Israeli law is severe: contact with foreign agents up to 15 years; providing intelligence over 10 years; aiding the enemy in wartime means life imprisonment or death. Berger warns against playing double agent: even a hotel worker near the Dead Sea who lied to Iranians about guest arrivals endangered lives and encouraged attacks.
People unfamiliar with this world should not engage in it. Contact is an offense, providing information is an offense, and aiding the enemy is the most severe.
Court Outcomes and Expert Assessments
Cases are progressing; 70-year-old Moti Maman got 10 years for entering Iran twice to plot terrorism, including Netanyahu assassination talks. Former Mossad operative Gad Shimron views the damage as tactical, not strategic, crediting Israel's 'electronic Iron Dome' for efficiency but urging vigilance: 'One should never underestimate the enemy. I am sure they are investing a lot of effort and that they have some successes we don’t yet know of.'
Most suspects await trial in custody, underscoring the persistent threat. Iran's tactics blend digital infiltration with personal manipulation, exploiting everyday platforms like Facebook for deadly gains.
